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Abstract
I extend the traditional Diamond Dybvig framework with aggregate liq-
uidity shocks to small open economies. Currency board may imply perfect
risk sharing (with perfect credit markets), contrary to Chang and Velasco
’s …ndings (2000). With interim-date borrowing constraints and …xed ex-
change rates, Wallace’ s (1990) partial suspension of convertibility of de-
posits is obtained. A banking system with an international lender may
implement both allocations without runs. Flexible exchange rates with
local-currency denominated deposits improves risk sharing relative to …xed
exchange rates when borrowing constraints are present.
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1. Introduction
This paper presents an extension of the traditional Bryant (1981) and Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) framework, embedded in a small open economy with aggre-
gate preference shocks. In a three period economy, each consumer may become
impatient (early consumer) or patient (late consumer). In the model, the number
of impatient consumers in the interim period may be either high or low. As a
benchmark, I …rst check that the socially e¢cient allocation with an (unlimited)
international credit line from an international lender implies perfect risk sharing,
meaning that a non-random and constant per-capita consumption for all agents.
It is also obvious that the availability of international credit always allows the
implementation of the optimal contract by a competitive banking system. This
implementation is free of bank runs given that the international institution also
acts as a lender of last resort with unlimited funds.
Since credit lines in reality are far from being unlimited as in the …rst case,
I introduce borrowing constraints in the social planner’s problem. I assume that
total available international funds are bounded above. In this context it is shown
that the constrained optimal contract implies partial suspension of convertibility
of deposits. An ine¢cient bank run equilibrium reappears, provided that no
extra credit is available for banks with a su¢ciently illiquid long term asset when
facing a panic. However, if an international lender of last resort is able to provide
extra funds at an interest rate which is bounded above by a ratio of long term
to short term deposits, then the run equilibrium disappears. This last result
shows the importance of institutions such as the IMF as a liquidity-based-bank-
run preventing device in borrowing-constrained small open economies. This issue
has been one of the central topics of the discussion about the international …nancial
architecture since the occurrence of the Asian Crisis in 1997.
This model allows an alternative interpretation of the rescue packages sent by
international institutions to Argentina during the Mexican Crisis in 1995. The the-
oretical model have interesting implications in terms of policy recommendations
in the context of the discussion about the role of international liquidity providers
in preventing crises. The paper also provides an argument favoring …xed exchange
rates with local lenders of last resort to complement the international funding in
order to satisfy transitory liquidity needs in local currency.
This paper also adds an interesting analysis on the role of the exchange rate
policy in the stability of the banking system. This work extends the discussion
presented in Chang and Velasco (2000) about how ‡exible exchange rates make
the …nancial system less fragile to the case of aggregate liquidity shocks. This
paper shows that with ‡exible exchange rates it is possible to implement better
allocations than with …xed exchange rates when the banking system is borrowing-
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constrained. Hence, …xed exchange rates or even currency boards could only
implement a better allocation when no borrowing constraints are added. The
partial - suspension - of - convertibility result is also replaced by a depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate. Thus, the exchange rate policy is used to manage
aggregate liquidity shocks concerning international currency.
This result also has important policy implications. In the context of the recent
crisis in Argentina, one of the most important points of discussion was the de-
dollarization of the …nancial system and a subsequent change in the exchange rate
regime. This paper shows as a corollary that a banking system with liabilities in
local currency combined with ‡exible exchange rates is able to o¤er better ex-ante
contracts to its depositors than with …xed exchange rates. This model predicts
then that a depreciation of the local currency may be the result of an increase in
the liquidity needs of the population. In other words, transitory illiquidity may
imply the need of a depreciation or devaluation of local currency.
Section 2 discusses the literature on bank runs in closed and small open
economies. Section 3 presents the economy. Section 4 analyzed the benchmark
case in which the social planner has unrestricted credit in period 1. Section 5
adds borrowing constraints to the planner’s problem of the economy in section 3.
Section 6 analyzes the case of ‡exible exchange rates. Section 7 discusses some
policy implications. Finally section 8 presents concluding remarks and points of
future research.
2. Related Literature
As mentioned before, the model is built on the Bryant (1980) and Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) tradition 1. The main feature in the current paper is the presence
of two currencies instead of the typical unique type of money in the literature.
However the two papers share with the standard literature the potential existence
of two equilibria, one involving runs.
The two main antecessors are the papers by Chang and Velasco (1998a and
2000). They construct a Bryant - Diamond - Dybvig model in a small open
economy. In the …rst paper (1998b) the long term investment is …nanced partially
by international borrowing (to be paid in the last period). Unlike Chang and
Velasco (2000), in my model both types of consumers (impatient and patient)
derive utility from local (real) currency holdings. The consumption for impatient
agents is …nanced by short term international funds to be paid at the end of the
economy.
Aggregate uncertainty is modelled as in Wallace (1988 and 1990). The amount
1For a survey on the bank runs literature see Freixas and Rochet (1997, chapter 7).
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of short run withdrawals is stochastic. In the …rst paper Wallace (1988) shows
that the two run-preventing regulatory regimes studied by Diamond and Dybvig
cannot be implemented, due to the non-observability of proportion of impatient
consumers. In the second paper Wallace (1990) presents a special case in which the
banking system ’s manager can learn the proportion through the order in which
consumers withdraw in the interim period. He shows that partial suspension of
convertibility in deposit contracts characterizes the planner’s optimal allocation.
I use this special device for the case of two currencies. More recently, Green and
Lin (2000) have shown that with a …nite number of depositors (and then, with
aggregate uncertainty in terms of the proportion of each type of agents) there
is a unique equilibrium involving no runs. However an important assumption in
this work is the fact that depositors know their position in line, which is absent in
Wallace (1990). Actually, Peck and Shell (2001) have recently shown that without
this assumption, runs could be part of the optimal contract.
In terms of the empirical literature that motivates this work, the papers by
Chang and Velasco’s (1998b) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini ’s (1998) con-
stitute competing interpretations on the causes of the recent Asian Crisis. The
point of view adopted in this paper is close to what Chang and Velasco (1998b)
call an international - illiquidity - based crisis. In a sense, what constitutes a
crisis in my model can be viewed as a liquidity shock. However, as we see below,
the interpretation of a crisis from the model is twofold. It can be viewed either
as part of the fundamentals or as a self-ful…lling crisis. This discussion is better
developed in section 6.
3. The Economy.
The economy lasts for three periods: t = 0; 1; 2: There are two currencies, called
home currency, or pesos, and foreign currency or dollars. I also use the term
money interchangeably with the term currency. There is only one consumption
good, which is the numeraire. The economy is small and open. Hence the price in
dollars of this good is assumed to be one, identifying then the consumption good
directly with the foreign currency. The two usual technologies in the literature
are assumed here. There is …rst a storage short run technology for the good that
returns one unit in period t+ 1 for each unit of the currency invested in period t
(with t = 0; 1). On the other hand there is a long-term investment opportunity.
For each unit of the good invested in this technology at date 0 it returns R > 1
units of the same type of money in period 2, but only r 2 (0; 1) in period 1:
There is a Lebesgue measure one of ex-ante identical consumers. At the be-
ginning of period 1 each person receives an idiosyncratic preference shock. This
determines whether the consumer survives until period 2 or dies at period 1: The
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ex-ante probability of dying in period 1 is ¼. The person who survives until date
1 is called impatient, otherwise she is patient. This probability is stochastic and
unknown ex-ante. In period 0 the proportion of impatient is a random variable.
For simplicity I adopt the device presented by Wallace (1990). Assume that ¼
can be either p® + (1¡ p) with probability q1 and p® with probability q2: The
complement is the set of patient agents. This is common knowledge. Any person
is within the …rst group with probability p and within the second group with
probability (1¡ p) : If a person is impatient her utility function is u (c1)+v (m1) ;
while if she is patient it is u (c2)+ v (m2) : Here ct denotes consumption of dollars
at date t; while mt is the consumption of pesos. The function u is C2; strictly in-
creasing and strictly concave. The function v is C2 and strictly concave. However
it possesses a satiation level ¹m > 0: This is taken from Chang and Velasco (2000),
and it re‡ects the idea that liquidity in local currency has (limited) uses in local
transactions. The di¤erence with that paper is that not only patient agents but
also the impatient ones derive utility from local-currency-real holdings. In some
sense utility functions are symmetric unlike preferences in the cited paper.
The ex-ante utility is as follows.
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where cjt (s) denotes consumption of dollars in period t, state s and position-in-line
j; and similarly for mjt (s) : Here s = 1 denotes the state in which all the people
in the second group are impatient, and s = 2 corresponds to the state in which
all of them are patient. Similarly, j = 1 denotes the (individual) state in which
the consumer is in the …rst group, while j = 2 denotes the state in which the
consumer is in the second group. Note that consumption of impatient consumers
within the …rst group does not depend on s; i.e., c11 and m
1
1 are both independent
of s: This is because I assume that the planner does not observe the aggregate
state s: She must infer it from the number of impatient trying to withdraw at
date 1: If only ®p impatient consumers show up, the planner infers (correctly)
that the proportion of impatient people is ®p and then the state is s = 1: If the
proportion exceeds ®p; this must be clearly equal to (®p + (1¡ p)) (provided that
nobody lies). Hence whenever the planner observes that there are more impatient
consumers than ®p, then she infers that the state is s = 2: However, in any case,
people who were lucky showing up …rst (among the …rst ®p) should receive the
same consumption in period 1 since the planner cannot know the state at that
stage, due to the sequential service constraint.
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4. Benchmark: The planner’s problem with unlimited funds
at date 1.
The planner borrows an amount of ¹d units of the consumption good at date 0.
Then she distributed this between the short run technology and the long run
asset. Let y be the amount of the good invested in the short run technology. Let
x denote the amount invested in the long run technology. At the beginning of
period 1 the preference shock is realized. The planner does not know directly
whether the proportion of impatient agents is high or low. She must learn this
through the actual amount of agents withdrawing at date 1. The planner is
able to di¤erentiate patient consumers from impatient ones, though. Impatient
consumers are ordered through a queue. In state 2 all impatient consumers receive
the same amount of consumption c11; as well as the satiation level of local currency,
¹m: Pesos are assumed to be issued by the planner at zero cost. In state 1, the
…rst p® impatient consumers also get c11; but the rest of impatient agents gets a
(potentially di¤erent) amount c21 (1) ; since the planner must learn through the
queue whether the true state is 1 or 2. In each case the planner potentially
borrows from abroad an additional amount of ¸ (s) dollars to be repaid at date
2. In this last period, the planner pays o¤ an amount of cj2 (s) dollars to those
patient consumers in state s; as well as the amount ¹m of pesos. This is done after
repaying the total debt, at a gross rate of 1:
The problem for the planner is then to maximize 3.1 subject to the constraints
x+ y 5 ¹d (4.1)
p®c11 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) 5 y + ¸ (1) (4.2)
p®c11 5 y + ¸ (2) (4.3)
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) +
¡
¹d+ ¸ (1)
¢
5 Rx (4.4)
p (1¡ ®) c12 (2) + (1¡ p) c22 (2) +
¡
¹d + ¸ (2)
¢
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for every t; s and j: The (su¢cient) …rst order conditions give the following result.
Proposition 4.1. The planner’s solution implies that:
c11 = c
2
1 (1) = c
j
2 (2) = c2 (1)
That is, there is perfect risk sharing at the solution of the planner’s problem:
Moreover the optimal consumption of dollars is equal to
¹c = (R ¡ 1) ¹d
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Clearly, the optimal amount of pesos is equal to its satiation level, ¹m:
Proof. See Appendix.
In this economy clearly perfect capital markets in period 1 are enough to
ensure perfect risk sharing for all agents. The presence of perfect credit markets
at date 1 implies market completeness. This is the underlying argument of the
last proposition, which contrasts clearly with the optimality-of-partial-suspension
result by Wallace (1990). In his article he showed that partial suspension is
optimal in a one - currency economy with …xed endowments. Proposition 4.1
con…rms the fact that Wallace’s result is a consequence of some type of market
incompleteness.
4.1. Implementation of the planner’s solution: the case of a currency
board.
This subsection shows how to implement the optimal allocation considered above
through …nancial institutions. Consider a mutual fund bank owned by all con-
sumers that pools resources and o¤ers contracts to consumers. There is also a
Central Bank that supplies local currency holdings. In this subsection it is as-
sumed that this institution acts as a currency board. This means that the Central
Bank commits itself to buy and sell dollars for pesos at the …xed rate of 1: At date
0, the private bank borrows ¹d dollars from abroad and invests this amount in the
long run and the short run asset. The commercial bank issues deposit contracts to
consumers, specifying the amount of pesos to be withdrawn in the corresponding
period.
At the beginning of date 1, the state s is realized. Neither the commercial
bank nor the Central Bank observe this realization. Impatient consumers show
up at the private bank to withdraw pesos. In this case I do not assume sequential
service constraints of any kind 2. Instead the commercial bank …rst gets all con-
2There are ways to assume sequential service constraints here. The commercial bank would
learn s through the amount of (impatient) consumers who show up to withdraw. The …nancial
intermediary then does not know the true s until the …rst ®p agents withdraw at date 1. If then
more consumers show up, then the bank interprets that s = 2: Otherwise the bank knows that
s = 1: At the beginning of date 1 the commercial bank borrows from an international lender an
amount to satisfy exactly the pesos to be withdrawn by impatient agents. More concretely, every
time a single consumer shows up at date 1; the commercial bank borrows the amount of dollars
to be paid to that agent. One possible story is that the bank operator calls the o¢ces of the
lender abroad every time the operator receives a request for withdrawal at date 1. Alternatively,
the operator may manage an account with the international lender and the Central Bank so
that, every time an impatient consumer shows up at date 1, the operator executes the process
through the account, getting automatically an electronic transfer from abroad, and immediately
transferring these dollars to the Central Bank in exchange for pesos. However, results in this
section do not depend on the absence of sequential service constraints.
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sumers together and then the bank borrows the corresponding amount of dollars
from abroad, selling them for pesos at the Central Bank and repaying then to
consumers. After the withdrawing session is …nished consumers use pesos for pur-
poses not modeled here. This gives utility v (m1). Then agents exchange pesos
for dollars at the Central Bank (at an exchange rate equal to one). Impatient
consumers consume dollars and disappear.
At the beginning of date 2 the bank must repay total debt using a portion of the
receipts from the long run investment returns. After repaying debt, the remaining
dollars are sold to the Central Bank in exchange for pesos (at an exchange rate
equal to one). Then the …nancial intermediary repeats the same process as in
period 1 with the remaining patient consumers. These receive pesos to be used
before being sold to the Central Bank. Finally, agents consume the dollars sold
by the Central Bank and the economy disappears.
The commercial bank then solves the same problem as the planner does with
the following extra - constraints.
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The …rst inequality corresponds to the incentive compatibility constraint. The
others state that the amount of pesos used in every period and state cannot exceed
the amount of pesos withdrawn from the commercial bank. This amount is equal
to the amount of dollars consumed since those pesos are sold at the Central Bank
after being used.
It is not di¢cult to show the conditions under which the planner’s allocation
presented above can be implemented in this currency board regime. The following
proposition shows when this is possible.
Proposition 4.2. Under the stated assumptions the planner’s solution can be
o¤ered in a decentralized banking system equilibrium with a currency board. If
¹m 5 ¹c; that is
R ¡ 1 ¸ ¹m¹d
then the …rst best is implemented with a banking contract that speci…es a with-
drawal of ¹c pesos per consumer. Otherwise implementation under these conditions
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is possible with a contract specifying a withdrawal of ¹m pesos with a return clause
of m ¡ c pesos to the Central Bank before selling of ¹c pesos takes place.
The proof of this result is in the appendix. It is not di¢cult to see the intuition.
If the optimal consumption of dollars is greater than the satiation level of pesos,
with the …rst speci…ed contract all consumers use only a portion of the local
currency withdrawn from banks and this amount is exactly the satiation level, ¹m.
After using this agents sell all pesos to the Central Bank, equal to the …rst best
amount of dollars ¹c: On the contrary, if the inequality is the reverse, the banking
system within a currency board regime can o¤er a contract specifying an initial
withdrawal of ¹m pesos to be used. Then a clause of a ¹m ¡ ¹c pesos return to the
Central Bank must be included so that total per-capita amount of pesos to be
sold is only ¹c pesos. The amount ¹m ¡ ¹c is …nanced by the international lender,
given absence of constraints at this stage.
In the last proposition we assumed that in period 2 the commercial bank sells
dollars after repaying debt to the Central Bank and there is no credit given by the
international lender at date 2. If we relax this, then the condition stated in the
last proposition is not necessary. Suppose that R ¡ 1 is strictly greater than ¹m¹d :
Consider the following timing of actions. Beginning date 1, commercial banks sell
all dollars to be paid to impatient consumers. Those dollars come from foreign
borrowing and revenues from the short run investment. The total amount of
dollars are enough to cover exactly the demand for dollars and pesos. The idea is
that the commercial bank borrows exactly ¹m dollars multiplied by the proportion
of consumers withdrawing at date 1, which are automatically sold to the Central
bank at a rate of 1 in exchanged for ¹m pesos. Hence every impatient consumer gets
exactly ¹m pesos from the bank. Consumers use these pesos and then each agent
returns ¹m¡¹c pesos to commercial banks. Banks sell these pesos again in exchange
for dollars, which are returned immediately to the international lender (assuming
that the gross rate of interest is equal to 1). The remaining amount of pesos in
the hands of impatient consumers is sold to the Central Bank in exchange for the
dollars bought by the monetary authority to the commercial banks. Impatient
agents consume those dollars at the end of period 1.
In period 2 a similar timing of event is observed. At the beginning of this
period commercial banks obtain the results of the long term investment. The
intermediaries pulls apart an amount equal to the dollars owed to the international
lender due to debt contracted in period 1. After this, given the assumption above,
commercial borrow again a per capita amount of dollars equal to ¹m ¡ ¹c from
the international lender. These are sold to the Central Bank at a rate of 1 in
exchange for pesos. Commercial banks pay ¹m to each patient consumer. After
using them consumers return ¹m ¡ ¹c pesos to commercial banks, who sell these
pesos to the Central Bank in exchange for dollars and then return these dollars
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to the international lender. Patient consumers …nally sell the remaining pesos to
the Central Bank in exchange for ¹c dollars and …nally consume them.
Then the following proposition arises.
Proposition 4.3. A banking system in a currency - board regime with an inter-
national lender of last resort with unlimited credit in periods 1 and 2 is always
able to implement the optimal consumption allocation.
The proof of this result is a straightforward extension of that of the last propo-
sition and thus omitted. The intuition is immediate. If the …rst best allocation
satis…es ¹m 5 ¹c the international lender of last resort actually operates as in the
proposition 4.1. If the reverse inequality holds, then the international lender
provides ¹m > ¹c dollars in period 1, state s; and ¹m ¡ ¡Rx¡ ¹d¢ in period 2: In
both cases the satiation level of local currency ¹m is ensured to all agents. Given
this, the optimal level of borrowing by the commercial banks ensure the …rst best
consumption allocation of dollars, ¹c:
4.2. No-runs with in…nitely available credit with unit gross rate.
Assume that the international institution commits to lend at zero net interest rates
any amount of dollars above ¸ (1) : The next result shows that this commitment
is enough to eliminate the run equilibrium in both exchange rate systems.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that the international lender lends any amount of
dollars to the banking system at zero net interest rates. Hence the run equilibrium
is eliminated, independently of the exchange rate system. (In the case of the …xed
exchange regime the Central Bank may still act temporarily as a local lender of
last resort).
The proof is in the Appendix. The intuition is standard. The fact that R > 1
implies that the long term investment is always able to honor all debt (includ-
ing that corresponding to the patient consumer allocation who withdraw early).
Hence no bank can fail (in the …xed exchange rate regime, the Central Bank al-
ways have enough dollars to be sold in exchange for pesos). Since the equilibrium
consumption allocation of dollars satis…es the incentive compatibility constraint
then all patient consumers prefer to wait (in the absence of bank failure). Thus
the international lender of last resort acts as a coordinating device that ensures
that the unique equilibrium is the one without runs. Hence this institution is
able to implement the …rst best allocation as an equilibrium (for the situations in
which proposition 4.2 holds).
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5. The planner’s problem with borrowing constraints.
The last section presents an economy with perfect international credit markets.
This clearly contradicts evidence. This is seriously a problem since most of the
recent crises were somehow caused by borrowing constraints. This section adds
restrictions in the borrowing of the social planner (or the commercial banks in
the banking system) in period 1. These constraints are somehow justi…ed by
the way institutions such as the IMF lend in practice to developing countries.
In particular, o¢cial documents from the IMF (2000) con…rm that members face
quotas of credit funding, based on the member ’s relative size. These quotas make
plausible that even a potential planner may face credit constraints that impedes
perfect risk sharing. I then extend the analysis above considering a constrained
optimum problem.
More formally, assume that the social planner maximizes (3:1) subject to the
constraints (4:2), (4:4), (4:5) and the following equations.
x+ y 5 d (5.1)
d+ ¸ (s) 5 ¹d; s = 1; 2 (5.2)
where now d is the decision variable and ¹d denotes now the (exogenous) total
credit availability at date 1: Here it is assumed that the planner does not observe
s at the beginning of period 1. Instead the impatient consumers form a line in
front of the pay-o¤ window of the planner, and this learns whether s is 1 or 2
through the amount of impatient agents who show up at date 1. In particular, if
the planner only ends up receiving ®p agents in period 1, then she interprets that
s = 1: If however after paying to ®p agents there is at least an extra consumer
showing up for payment, then she learns that s = 2: The probability that, in state
1; each consumer is included in the …rst ®p agents is equal to p: In this case, for
every impatient agent who shows up in period 1 for payment the planner may
borrow a certain amount of dollars from the international lender to pay o¤ the
consumer. Hence the international lender also learns the state s exactly as the
social planner does. Relaxations of this assumption seem important but it involves
more complicated issues on contract design. This is left for future research.
5.1. Characterization of the constrained optimum.
Due to the borrowing restrictions at date 1, the optimal consumption allocation
under these constraints may not be deterministic as in the unrestricted credit
case. In particular, it is possible that the consumption allocation of dollars may
not be the same for the impatient consumers who are paid …rst and those who
are paid secondly. The next proposition shows that …rst - in - line depositors get
a higher level of consumption than the those in the second group.
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Proposition 5.1. The second best allocation implies that c11 > c21 (1). In this
allocation all agents consume the satiation level of pesos, ¹m:
The proof is presented in the appendix. Hence, partial suspension of con-
vertibility (in the sence of Wallace, 1990) reappears here, even though (imperfect)
credit markets are available for the planner in the interim period. This proposition
implies that it is enough to impose an exogenous constraint to the planner (bor-
rower) involving periods 0 and 1 loans to generate this result. In a sense, a binding
borrowing constraint is associated with high liquidity needs in the economy. In
this situation, the proposition would predict that banks should partially suspend
the convertibility of certi…cates of deposit in an event of aggregate illiquidity;
which is signaled by facing binding borrowing constraints.
In the proof of the last proposition it is shown that impatient agents’s con-
sumption can be …nanced in di¤erent ways. However, it is characterized by strictly
positive borrowing in period 1, state 1, and also strictly positive investment in
the short run asset and/or strictly positive borrowing at date 1, state 2. Hence
it can be assumed without loss of generality that the consumption of the …rst ®p
consumers is entirely …nanced by the liquid investment and, in state 1, the rest
of payments is …nanced through borrowing.
5.2. Implementation of the constrained e¢cient allocation
The allocation obtained above can be implemented through a similar banking
system to the one presented in section 4. However I introduce an additional
informational assumption for banks. In period 0 banks are formed as mutual
funds. Each bank is operated on behalf of consumers. Banks borrow from a
(private) international lender an amount d of dollars and they invest it in both the
liquid and the illiquid asset. The idea is that commercial banks (as de…ned before)
face the borrowing constraint (5:2) at date 1. Therefore …nancial intermediaries
can only borrow up to ¹d dollars in total.
The rest of the implementation depends on the assumption about ¹m and the
optimal consumption of dollars. Assume ¹m 5 c21 (1) …rst. Consider then the
following timing of actions. At the beginning of period 1, state s is realized
but not observed by anybody in this economy. Each consumer does observe her
own type privately. Commercial banks, who held an amount of liquid reserves
in dollars, sell them to the Central Bank in exchange for pesos. Then impatient
consumers show up at the bank in a random order. If s = 2; only a proportion of
®p consumers withdraw from the banks. Each one gets c11 pesos, …nanced by the
selling of dollars to the Central Bank. If s = 1, and after the …rst ®p consumers
withdraw, more consumers will show up at the bank. Then the …nancial institution
immediately borrows ¸ (1) dollars from the same lender as in period 0 and sell
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them to the Central Bank in exchange for pesos. Hence the rest of the impatient
consumers (measure of 1 ¡ p) get c21 (1) pesos. Given that ¹m 5 c21 (1), each of
the impatient consumers use ¹m pesos (a portion of what each withdrew from the
bank) giving her utility of v ( ¹m) : After this, consumers sell all pesos to the Central
Bank in exchange for dollars and consume them. In period 2, commercial banks
obtain the receipts from the illiquid investment. First they return all debt to be
honored to the international lender. The remaining dollars are sold to the Central
Bank, which are just enough to get pesos (at an exchange rate of 1) and honor
all patient consumer’s deposits. Each of the patient consumers gets c2 (s) pesos
in state s: Given that c11 5 c2 (s) for all s; then patient agents have enough pesos
to satisfy the optimal satiation level ¹m: At the end of period 2; patient agents
sell all pesos in exchange for dollars (at a one-to-one basis) and then consume
all dollars. Hence, under the condition ¹m 5 c21 (1) ; a banking system within a
currency board regime implements the credit - constrained optimal allocation.
The next proposition summarizes this.
Proposition 5.2. Whenever ¹m 5 c21 (1) the second best allocation is imple-
mented as an equilibrium of a banking system similar to that of section 4.2 within
a currency bard regime.
The formal proof is omitted, since it follows similar lines as in the proof of
proposition 4.2. If the condition above is not satis…ed, a local lender of last resort,
providing transitory liquidity in pesos for at least a group of impatient agents,
may be needed to implement the second best allocation. Consider the following
timing of actions. Actions at date 0 are identical to the system described above
in this section. At the beginning of period 1, commercial banks sell all dollars
from the liquid investment in exchange for pesos. If s = 2, the Central Bank
also lends to the commercial bank a per-capita amount of local currency equal
to [max f0; ¹m¡ c11g]®p, so that each impatient consumer withdraws from the
commercial bank exactly ¹m pesos. Each of these consumers is committed to
return max f0; ¹m¡ c11g pesos to the commercial bank before selling pesos to the
Central Bank. If s = 1; then private banks detect this realization of the state
as long as an additional impatient consumer shows up at date 1 after the …rst
®p agents withdrew. In this case, each commercial bank immediately borrows
¸ (1) dollars from the international lender and then sell them to the Central Bank
in exchange for ¸ (1) pesos. In addition, the Central Bank lends an additional
amount of [ ¹m¡ c21 (1)] (1¡ p) pesos to the commercial bank, so that each of
these impatient consumers also withdraw ¹m pesos. Each of these consumers is
also committed to return to the private bank exactly [ ¹m¡ c21 (1)] pesos before
selling pesos to the Central Bank. All these pesos are used during period 1,
giving utility v ( ¹m) : Consumers then return to the private banks the committed
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amount of pesos. Commercial banks then return these pesos lent by the monetary
authority, destroying those pesos. The remaining stock of local currency is sold
by the impatient consumers to the Central Bank in exchange for dollars at the
exchange rate of one. Impatient agents consume those dollars at the end of period
1.
In period 2 a similar timing of event is observed. At the beginning of this period
commercial banks get the results of the long term investment. The intermediaries
return all dollars owed to the international lender. The remaining is sold to the
Central Bank in exchange for pesos. Commercial banks potentially borrow from
the Central Bank so that each patient consumer withdraws ¹m pesos. The pesos to
be lent by the Central Bank in state s is equal to max f0; ¹m¡ c2 (s)g multiplied
by the total Lebesgue measure of patient consumers in state s. Each consumer
has the obligation to return the amount max f0; ¹m¡ c2 (s)g to the private bank
before selling any pesos to the Central Bank. Consumers then use ¹m pesos. Then
patient agents return the committed amount of pesos to the commercial banks,
and these repay the debt to the Central Bank. Patient consumers …nally sell the
remaining pesos to the Central Bank in exchange for dollars at the exchange rate
of one and …nally consume them.
This argument allows to show that:
Proposition 5.3. Suppose ¹m > c21 (1) : Then implementation of the constrained
optimum demands a …xed exchange rate regime with a local lender of last resort.
The proof is in the appendix. As long as the satiation level of pesos satis…es
both inequalities above; impatient consumers …rst - in - line get enough pesos as
in the second best solution with a currency board. This is because commercial
banks can sell a su¢cient amount of dollars to the local Central Bank in order
to satisfy pesos consumption with what deposit certi…cates give to agents. If the
above inequality does not hold, the Central Bank must lend the di¤erence to the
commercial banks in at least one state and period. This loan is repaid immediately
before consumers sell pesos for dollars at the Central Bank.
5.3. Bank Runs and Lenders of Last Resort
With credit constraints, it is natural to re-think how ine¢cient bank runs arise in
equilibrium. Clearly, as it is the case in the literature the conditions for which bank
runs constitute another equilibrium is linked to the return of early liquidation of
the long run asset, r; as well as to the consumption allocation at the constrained
optimum. (The proof is found in the appendix).
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Proposition 5.4. Assume that
r < R
µ
c21 (1)
c2 (1)
¶
Then the contract that implements the constrained optimum (whether it is done
under the currency board or the …xed exchange rate regime) is subject to runs.
That is, there is another equilibrium in which either commercial banks (in the
currency board case) or the Central Bank (in the …xed exchange rate regime case)
fail in period 1. Otherwise no failure takes place.
This is an extension of the result by Chang and Velasco (2000). Given the
condition above the commercial banks need to liquidate all of the long term invest-
ment in the interim period. Recall that if more than a measure of ®p consumers
withdraw at date 1 then …nancial intermediaries and the Central Bank infer that
the true state is s = 1: But then each consumer should get c21 (1) : However the
inequality implies that total date-1 assets are lower than total dollars demanded
in period 1, implying the failure of either the intermediary (in the currency board
regime) or the monetary authority (in the …xed exchange rate regime, due to its
role as local lender in pesos).
Thus, it is clear that the existence of an international lender of last resort
constitutes a run-preventing device. Suppose that this international institution
provides liquidity in dollars in period 1 above the debt constraint imposed by the
private international institution, ¹d dollars. Then, it is easy to show the following
result (the proof is in the appendix).
Proposition 5.5. Assume that an international lender of last resort is able to
lend any amount whenever a threat of panic arises in the banking system. Then,
as long as the gross interest rate is less than or equal to c2 (1) = c11 (2) the run
equilibrium is eliminated.
The main conclusion is that this international lending institution eliminates
the run equilibrium allowing for implementation of the second best allocation
without panics, as long as the interest rate charged by the international lender is
not too high. Therefore the international lender of last resort is always su¢cient
to prevent liquidity-based bank runs in a two-currency economy, where the local
currency is used only intra-period.
5.4. An example: linear quadratic case
To illustrate these conditions I present a numerical example based on linear
quadratic utility functions. Assume that
u (c) = ¡°
2
c2 + ¯c+ ±
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where all coe¢cients are strictly positive and ¯ > R ¹d: This is so to assume that,
on the relevant domain, u0 (c) > 0. Assume also that
v (m) = ¡1
2
m2 + ¼m+ º
Then:
¹m = ¼
Given the utility function u above we have that the …rst order conditions can
be reduced to the following linear system.
c11 ¡ q1c21 (1)¡ q2c2 (2) = 0
¡°c11 + °Rq1c2 (1) + °Rq2c2 (2) = ¯ (R ¡ 1)
R®pc11 +R (1¡ p) c21 (1) + p (1¡ ®) c2 (1) = (R¡ 1) ¹d
R®pc11 + (R ¡ 1) (1¡ p) c21 (1) + (p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p) c2 (2) = (R¡ 1) ¹d
which can be written in the following way2664
1 ¡q1 0 ¡q2
¡° 0 °Rq1 °Rq1
R®p R (1¡ p) p (1¡ ®) 0
R®p (R¡ 1) (1¡ p) 0 (p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p)
3775
2664
c11
c21 (1)
c2 (1)
c2 (2)
3775 =
2664
0
¯ (R¡ 1)
¹d (R ¡ 1)
¹d (R ¡ 1)
3775
The proof of this is directly derived from the …rst order conditions and left to
the reader. As the explicit solution does not give a specially intuitive condition, I
prefer to report the solutions to these problems for numerical examples. Assume
the following values for the parameters.
p ® q1 R ¯ °
0:25 0:20 0:5 1:5 10 1
The following table shows the second best allocations for three values of ¹d:
allocationnvalue of ¹d 4 5 6
c11 1:1742 1:5419 1:9097
c21 (1) 0:5548 0:9484 1:3419
c2 (1) 6:4387 6:5871 6:7355
c2 (2) 1:7935 2:1355 2:4774
The next table shows values of ¼ that allows implementation by a commercial
banking system with a currency board regime for each value of ¹d; given in fact by
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the second row c21 (1) : It also gives the upper bound for r so that illiquidity is ver-
i…ed. It …nally has upper bounds for the interest rate charged by the international
lender of last resort in order to prevent runs.
variablesnvalue of ¹d 4 5 6
¼ 0:5548 0:9484 1:3419
r 0:1292 0:2159 0:2988
int. rate 11:605 6:9455 5:0194
Note that the maximum interest rate that can be charged by the international
lender of last resort behaves as if it is decreasing in ¹d: A possible interpretation
states that, as the availability of credit in the second best problem increases, the
disparity between consumption assigned to (second group) impatient agents and
the patient consumers at date 2 decreases. But the upper bound of the interest
rate on the credit line provided by the international liquidity provider is lower
the closer are these two consumption values. Basically, the greater ¹d; the more
generous is the payment to the impatient consumers in period 1 and the greater
is the need of credit in this same period to prevent panics. Hence the interest rate
must be less tight to implement this procedure.
6. Constrained optimum and Flexible Exchange Rates
In the last section, implementation of the constrained optimal allocation implies
that, when ¹m > c21 (1) ; impatient agents who withdrew pesos must return them
to the Chang and Velasco (2000) demonstrated that, in the absence of aggregate
uncertainty, a f lexible exchange rate regime is able to implement the optimal
allocation without runs. This policy can be interpreted in fact as a threat of
devaluation, since in their equilibrium the exchange rate remains …xed at 1. Hence,
their model does not generate any equilibrium exchange rate depreciation. The
model presented in last section can be adapted so that the implementation of a
constrained optimum implies exchange rate devaluations.
Suppose an economy as in section 5. Consider the planner problem …rst.
Assume now that the planner can observe the aggregate state s at the beginning
of period 1. In this case, there is clearly only one consumption variable for that
state. That is, c1 (s) denotes consumption of dollars for the agent given that she
is impatient in period 1 and given the state s: Hence, ex-ante preferences are now
de…ned as follows.
q1 f[p® + (1¡ p)] [u (c1 (1)) + v (m1 (1))] + p (1¡ ®) [u (c2 (1)) + v (m2 (1))]g
+q2 fp® [u (c1 (2)) + v (m1 (2))] + [p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] [u (c2 (2)) + v (m2 (2))]g
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where ct (s) denotes the consumption of dollars by the agent at date t = 1; 2,
aggregate state s, andmt (s) denotes the amount of pesos consumed at date t; state
s: The problem for the planner now is to maximize this utility function subject
to the same constraints as the planner in section 5 (I maintain the borrowing
constraint). It is clear that the following proposition must be true (The proof is
in the appendix).
Proposition 6.1. The solution to the planner ’s problem in the case of a pub-
licly observed aggregate state s is incentive - compatible for each consumer and
implies a higher ex-ante expected utility relative to that with the informational
restrictions.
Therefore, this allocation is Pareto - improving relative to that studied in last
section. It is still less preferable than the one in section 4, given that c1 (1) <
c1 (2) at the solution. That is, optimal consumption at date 1 is stochastic.
6.1. Implementation: Flexible (Contingent) Exchange Rate Policy
This subsection embeds the same banking system described in section 5 into
a ‡exible exchange rate regime. This exchange rate policy is similar to that
used in Chang and Velasco (2000). Consider the banking system analyzed in
section 5. This means that commercial banks cannot directly learn the realization
of s at the beginning of date 1: With …xed exchange rates, commercial banks
cannot implement the allocation in the last subsection, since the optimal allocation
implies a di¤erent consumption allocation for all impatient agents in period 1,
according to the realization of the aggregate state. However, a similar banking
system can work here if coped with a flexible exchange rate.
Consider the following bank. It borrows d dollars from abroad at date 0 and
invests in both the illiquid long term and the liquid short term assets. Each
consumer has the right to withdraw ¹m pesos in period 1, in any state and max
f ¹m; c2 (s)g at date 2; state s: At the beginning of date 1, the realization of s is not
observed by anyone in the economy. The realization of types are observed only
by each individual consumer. Then the Central Bank issues (p®+ 1¡ p) ¹m pesos
to the commercial banks. Each commercial bank pays ¹m pesos to the impatient
consumers withdrawing in the interim period. If the aggregate state is s = 2;
then the commercial bank pays returns to the Central Bank a total of (1¡ p) ¹m
pesos after honoring the deposits of the p® impatient consumers. Each impatient
agent uses the ¹m pesos (getting utility v ( ¹m)). Then these consumers sell ¹m
pesos at the Central Bank in exchange for dollars. The Central Bank has learned
the realization of s through the amount of withdrawals at the commercial banks.
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Therefore the banking authority …xes the exchange rate between pesos and dollars
in the following way
e1 (s) ´ ¹m
c1 (s)
(6.1)
This implies that each impatient consumer gets exactly c1 (s) dollars to consume
at date 1. Finally, the same timing is observed at date 2. At the beginning
of this period, the Central Bank issues max f ¹m; c2 (s)g pesos multiplied by the
proportion of patient consumers in state s. These pesos are delivered to the
commercial banks. Each private bank pays this amount of pesos to each patient
consumer withdrawing in period 2. After this, the private bank gets the revenue
from the long term asset, returns foreign debt dollars and sell the remaining dollars
to the Central Bank. Meanwhile, patient consumers use ¹m pesos giving utility
v ( ¹m) : Then, consumers sell the pesos to the Central Bank at the exchange rate
e2 (s) ´ max
½
¹m
c2 (s)
; 1
¾
(6.2)
It can be easily seen that each patient agent gets c2 (s) dollars to be consumed
at the end of period 2. Therefore, this …nancial system implements the optimal
allocation. The next proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 6.2. A banking system as described in section 5 can implement the
optimal allocation if the Central Bank …xes the exchange rates as in equations 6.1
in period 1 and 6.2 in period 2.
Thus, exchange rates do depend on the state and time. In other words, the
exchange rate policy that implements the optimal allocation is contingent. The
important point is that, even with foreign credit restrictions and lack of informa-
tion about the realization of the aggregate shock, this banking system is able to
implement a better allocation than that of section 5. However, it seems that a
‡exible exchange rate is important for this implementation to occur.
6.2. Exchange Rate Policy as a Bank-Run Preventing Device
Chang and Velasco (2000) showed that a similar exchange rate policy prevents
bank runs. In this paper, the same conclusion can be easily obtained after some
adaptations of that same result.
Proposition 6.3. Under contingent (perfectly credible) exchange rate policies,
the unique equilibrium corresponds to the optimal allocation. Hence bank runs
cannot occur in equilibrium.
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Proof. The Central Bank issues at the beginning of date 1 …rst an amount
of (p®+ 1¡ p) ¹m pesos to be delivered to commercial banks. Suppose that s =
1: If, after the …rst p® + 1 ¡ p people withdraw ¹m pesos more consumers show
up (this happens in the event of a run), then the commercial bank asks for an
extra p (1¡ ®) ¹m pesos to be delivered to all consumers who want pesos in that
period. Suppose that only p (1¡ ®) ¡ ¼ extra consumers withdraw. Hence the
commercial bank returns the di¤erence to the Central Bank and also (in exchange
for the pesos payed to consumers) delivers (p® + 1¡ p) c1 (1) dollars, coming from
liquid assets and foreign borrowing only (there is no early liquidation of the long
term asset). Hence, if total amount of circulating pesos is [(p®+ 1¡ p)+ p (1¡ ®)
¡¼] ¹m pesos, the Central Bank sets simply the exchange rate equal to
be1 (1) ´ [(p® + 1¡ p) + p (1¡ ®)¡ ¼] ¹m
(p®+ 1¡ p) c1 (1)
Each consumer gets in period 1 a total of (p®+1¡p)
[(p®+1¡p)+p(1¡®)¡¼]c1 (1) dollars, which is
clearly less than c1 (1) : Since the optimal allocation implies that c2 (s) ¸ c1 (1) ;
then all patients will not …nd optimal to withdraw at date 1.
Suppose that the true state is s = 2: The argument is similar to the one above.
Suppose that the proportion of consumers withdrawing at date 1 is strictly greater
than p®. Let p®+ ´ denote the actual proportion of agents withdrawing ¹m pesos
in period 1. Total amount of pesos issued at that date is then (p® + ´) ¹m: Again,
commercial banks deliver to the Central Bank a total amount of (p®+ ´) c1 (1) :
This is so because the proportion of consumers withdrawing at date 1 is strictly
higher than p®: Banks then wrongly perceive that the state is s = 1: Hence
they liquidate the short term asset and borrow from abroad so that banks get
(p® + 1¡ p) c1 (1) dollars to be delivered to the Central Bank. In this case, then
the exchange rate is equal to
be1 (1) ´ [p®+ ´] ¹m
(p® + ´) c1 (1)
=
¹m
c1 (1)
Thus, each patient consumer gets c1 (1) dollars at date 1 if they run, which is
(weakly) dominated by c2 (s) : Hence, no patient consumer chooses to withdraw
at date 1 in state 2: This shows that the optimal allocation constitutes the unique
equilibrium of this system.
Note that the argument uses the fact that the exchange rate policy will be
applied in period 1 with certainty. If the Central Bank cannot commit to this
policy ex-ante, then the same argument may fail, depending upon the incentives
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to deviate by the monetary authority. Kawamura (2001) actually shows that,
in absence of aggregate uncertainty, the devaluation threat introduced by Chang
and Velasco (2000) may not be credible, in the sense that a benevolent Central
Bank may want to deviate from that policy. However the same result has not
been extended to the aggregate uncertainty case.
7. Empirical and Policy Implications
The results in this paper sheds some light on the discussion about contingent
credit lines for …nancial systems. Propositions 4.1 and 5.1 state that international
institutions may provide funds with high liquidity needs in the short run, so that
withdrawals do not have to be suspended. This is helpful to interpret the bank-
ing distress situation in Argentina, in 1995, after the Mexican crisis. The model
suggests that the help from the International Monetary Fund, the Inter American
Development Bank and the World Bank was mainly directed to provide funds
due to a fundamental liquidity shock faced by the banking system of this country
(besides the banking system restructuring process, see Camdessus, 1995). It is
interesting to compare this view to the traditional self-ful…lling run interpretation
of such a crisis. The banking crisis in Argentina in 1995 may be viewed as a high
realization of the liquidity shock. This interpretation seems to be more consistent
with the model presented here than with the usual (ine¢cient) equilibrium inter-
pretation. As Chang and Velasco (1998a) and others have shown, in a traditional
Diamond - Dybvig model without aggregate uncertainty a lender of last resort
always prevents runs. Hence runs cannot occur in these equilibria. This is incon-
sistent with the evidence. Proposition 5.1 specially implies that, in state 1 (when
the proportion of impatient consumers is high) banks must reduce payments at
some point. It also implies that the borrowing constraint is binding. This can
be interpreted as a situation in which the government negotiates an increase in
loans (which is not necessary with lower liquidity needs). This negotiation actu-
ally happened in 1995 (see the document IMF News, 1995). The actual increase
in Disbursements from 1994 to 1995 to Argentina was larger than 2.5 times (from
611.95 millions of ADR’s to 1,558.966 millions).
On the other hand, proposition 5.3 states that an international lender may
need to be coupled with a suitable local lender of last resort to implement the
optimal allocation, except when the demand for local currency is not too high. In a
sense this result suggests that both institutions could complement, not substitute,
each other. However such a local lender cannot have a loose behavior. The
main danger of a local lender in this situation is to worsen the foreign reserves
situation having too many customers with local currency holdings selling them to
the Central Bank. Thus the purpose of the local lender must be limited only to
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cover local currency liquidity needs. In a di¤erent model, Antinol…, Huybens and
Keister (2000) emphasize the need of restrictions imposed on the local lender. In
particular, they show that a costless local lender (as it is in my model) implies a
continuum of hyperin‡ationary equilibria. This clearly calls for either high interest
rates or for upper bounds on local currency supply to rule this situation out.
It is worth emphasizing that this paper does not try to answer general questions
on social optimality of a currency board compared to other exchange rate regimes.
The scope of this work is more modest. However this paper predicts that, for
economies with low level of demand for local currencies, a currency board is
consistent with full insurance against liquidity shocks. As long as either the
return on long term investments is high enough (and certain) or the availability of
credit in dollars is high enough, then a currency board is able to provide perfect
risk sharing to the customers of a banking system with simple peso-denominated
deposit contracts. More in general this implies that countries with a very low
relative demand for local currency (relative to foreign currency) may be more
propense to use currency boards. Unfortunately I have found no evidence on this
issue yet. However this prediction can be contrasted using indirect indicators
such as foreign - currency - denominated deposit contracts. A more direct way
to contrast the prediction is to look at the units of account used in several main
transactions. Casual evidence in Argentina suggests that most important types
of transactions (such as real estate and durables) are made using the American
dollar as the unit of account. I leave this problem for future research.
The analysis in section 6 implies that, when foreign credit restrictions are
binding, then the optimal allocation may call for ‡exible exchange rates. This
statement must be quali…ed. Results in last section only refer to the virtues
of ‡exibility of exchange rates in terms of absorbing liquidity shocks. However,
there is a well-known large body of literature about the credibility issues that
‡exible exchange rates with loose …scal behavior imply in emerging economies. In
a sense, section 6 is not intended to defend ‡exible exchange rates per-se. On the
contrary, it con…rms the necessity of rules (although these are contingent) to make
the policy credible (recall that the exchange rate policy in section 6 is credible
due to perfect commitment by the Central Bank).
This analysis also seems helpful to re‡ect on the recent recipees on the recent
Argentine crisis. Several policy suggestions were given as a way out of the currency
board regime. Among others, perhaps the Haussman’s proposal (2001) was the
best known in the academic area, although this proposal has been published in
a newspaper. In any case, Haussman proposed a de-dollarization of liabilities in
Argentina as an essential pre-requisite to ‡oating exchange rates. In terms of the
model in section 6, this proposal seems to make sense for banks (under the caveats
discussed in the paragraph above). The model predicts that ‡exible rates with
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peso - denominated bank liabilities implies a better insurance against aggregate
liquidity shocks than either a …xed exchange rate, a currency board or even a
dollarized3 banking system.
A special remark is that the local lender is active only when the transitory
illiquidity in local currency arises. This assumes a large degree of commitment
by the institution acting as a local lender (usually the Central Bank). This also
has policy implications. Implementing such mechanism in this way implies the
creation of institutions or legal systems that prevents irresponsible behavior by
the acting local lender (creating liquidity when there is no need of it). In the
case of the …rst best allocation, we know that the limit of this amount of credit
is equal to the di¤erence between the per-capita desired amount of pesos and the
net return on the long term investment, multiplied by the credit available in the
…rst period, in per capita terms. This is a measurable limit for credit in pesos by
the local monetary authority. Hence the setting up of a local lender of last resort
demands the creation of very solid laws and institutions to avoid local lender
misbehavior. Another possible way is to have international institutions such as
the IMF monitoring the functioning of such local lenders.
On the other hand, as long as the funds from this credit line are used to help
transitorily illiquid …nancial systems, then proposition 5.4 speci…es that these
credit lines, regardless of the exchange rate regime, always prevents runs. Also,
proposition 5.4 suggests upper bounds for the interest rate that the international
lender of last resort must charge in order to make repayment feasible. Once more
the main problem here is to measure deposits with di¤erent horizons so that
interest rates on these credit lines still allow its preventing role. I do not suggest
to take these ratios literally, but they constitute a major guide for interest rate
negotiations.
From the paragraphs above it is clear that implementing such institutions is
not easy. Monitoring costs (in the sense of keeping track of deposits) and the
problem of measuring the liquidity needs in each currency are di¢cult. This
does not mean that they are infeasible in practice, but the implicit informational
assumptions give a warning in terms of how to implement them. In any case all
these regulatory regimes implied by the results deal with liquidity problems. It
does not say anything in terms of solvency issues. The main challenge in practice is
to discover whether certain …nancial distress phenomena were caused by liquidity
or solvency problems. This still remains an open question for the policy makers.
3The dollarization case was not discussed since it is a trivial extension of Wallace ’s (1990)
work.
23
8. Concluding remarks and possible extensions
This paper has presented an extension of the Diamond - Dyvbig framework to
a banking system with two currencies. It was also assumed that the proportion
of impatient consumers is unknown (ex-ante). The …rst point is that a banking
system within a currency board regime implements a …rst best allocation as an
equilibrium, although this implementation depends on the type of deposit con-
tract. Then, a local lender of last resort may be useful for implementation.
A second important message is that this model is able to predict a reduction
in deposit payments when the liquidity shock is high. The model also predicts a
binding borrowing constraint. These two features resembles events in which local
banking systems received funds from international institutions when facing some
situation of distress. The model also emphasizes the importance of the interest
rate level on those funds. These cannot be too high so that repayment is ensured.
The upper bound is related to the ratio of long term over short term deposits.
This has implications on the design process of contingent credit lines.
A possible direction for future work is the construction of a version of this
model in a world integrated economy with two tradable currencies, following also
similar ideas as in Allen and Gale (2000). There are several issues that can be
addressed with this framework. Perhaps one of the most discussed issues is the
incentive to constitute the reserves for the international lender of last resort. In the
paper I have presented such problem could not be studied since the economy was
of the small open type. A world integrated economy with well-de…ned participants
could help to see when each country is willing to deposit funds in an international
institution.
Fundamental shocks can be introduced, making either the short term rate (as
in Chang and Velasco, 1998a) or the long investment return (as in Allen and
Gale, 1998) stochastic. This would allow to study solvency - based runs and the
role of the lenders of last resort to prevent such runs, if these are not optimal.
Nevertheless, problems of asymmetric information could worsen here. The reason
is that, when returns are risky, adverse selection may not allow for availability of
an international lender of last resort. This issue should be studied in combination
with a world-integrated environment.
A related topic to the solvency problem is the explicit separation between
managers and depositors. By study a version of this banking model in which
managers do not have the same objective as the depositors the moral hazard
considerations mentioned above could be seriously addressed. That is, moral
hazard considerations are to be studied in settings where those objectives are
discordant, since it is obvious that when they are the same hidden action problems
cannot arise. There are several alternatives for modelling this. There is a vast
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literature on incomplete contracts in banking (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993
and 1994). Chang and Velasco (1998a) also present a model in which the banking
sector is monopolistic. Any of these frameworks could be helpful to study moral
hazard and lenders of last resort. Finally, issues on insurance schemes (in the
spirit of Druck, 2000, for example) can also be considered in the international
setting.
A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 4.1
The …rst order conditions are as follows:
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = Á0 (A.1)
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 Á0 (A.2)
Á1 (1) 5 Á2 (1) (A.3)
Á1 (2) 5 Á2 (2) (A.4)
u0
¡
c11
¢
= Á1 (1) + Á1 (2) (A.5)
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)¢ = Á1 (1) (A.6)
q1u
0 ¡c12 (1)¢ = Á2 (1) (A.7)
q2u
0 ¡cj2 (2)¢ = Á2 (2) (A.8)
where j = 1; 2 in the last inequality. This last equality implies that c12 (2) =
c22 (2) ´ c2 (2) : The …rst four expressions correspond to the …rst derivative of
the Lagrangian with respect to x; y; ¸ (1) and ¸ (2) respectively. The last four
expressions are the …rst order conditions with respect to c11; c
2
1 (1) ; c
1
2 (1) and
c2 (2) :
I …rst show that y¤ = 0: Using contradiction, assume that y¤ > 0: Then from
A.1 and A.2 we have
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] = R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)]
> [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)]
On the other hand, we have
Á1 (1) 5 Á2 (1)
Á1 (2) 5 Á2 (2)
and therefore
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)]
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a contradiction. Hence y¤ > 0:
Then this implies that Á1 (1) = Á2 (1) and Á1 (2) = Á2 (2) : From the expres-
sions A.7, A.8 and A.5 we get
u0
¡
c21 (1)
¢
= u0
¡
c12 (1)
¢
u0
¡
c11
¢
= q1u
0 ¡c12 (1)¢+ q2u0 (c2 (2))
Obviously, from the …rst equation we get c21 (1) = c
1
2 (1) : On thee other hand,
from the constraints (holding with strict equality)
p®c11 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) = ¸ (1)
p®c11 = ¸ (2)
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) +
¡
¹d + ¸ (1)
¢
= R ¹d
p (1¡ ®) c12 (2) + (1¡ p) c22 (2) +
¡
¹d+ ¸ (2)
¢
= R ¹d
implies that
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) + p®c11 + (1¡ p) c21 (1)
= (R ¡ 1) ¹d
= [p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] c22 (2) + p®c11
and therefore
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) + (1¡ p) c21 (1) = [p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] c22 (2)
But c21 (1) = c
1
2 (1). This implies that c
2
1 (1) = c
1
2 (1) = c
2
2 (2) ´ ¹c: But then, from
u0
¡
c11
¢
= q1u
0 ¡c12 (1)¢+ q2u0 (c2 (2))
we get that c11 = ¹c; showing that perfect risk sharing is the only solution to the
planner’s problem.
Then, from the constraint
p (1¡ ®) c12 (2) + (1¡ p) c22 (2) +
¡
¹d+ ¸ (2)
¢
= R ¹d
we have that
[p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] ¹c+ ¸ (2) = (R ¡ 1) ¹d
But
¸ (2) = p®¹c
so that
[p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] ¹c+ p®¹c = (R ¡ 1) ¹d
and then
¹c = (R ¡ 1) ¹d
This ends the proof.
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A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.2
Ignoring the incentive compatibility constraints for a moment, the …rst order
conditions of the commercial banking problem can be written as follows.
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = Á0 (A.9)
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 Á0 (A.10)
Á1 (1) 5 Á2 (1) (A.11)
Á1 (2) 5 Á2 (2) (A.12)
u0
¡
c11
¢
= Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)¡ Ã1 (1) ¡ Ã1 (2) (A.13)
v0
¡
m11
¢
= Ã1 (1) + Ã1 (2) (A.14)
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)¢ = Á1 (1) ¡ Ã1 (1) (A.15)
q1v
0 ¡m21 (1)¢ = Ã1 (1) (A.16)
q1u
0 ¡c12 (1)¢ = Á2 (1) ¡ Ã2 (1) (A.17)
q1v
0 ¡m12 (1)¢ = Ã2 (1) (A.18)
q2u
0 ¡cj2 (2)¢ = Á2 (2) ¡ Ã2 (2) (A.19)
q2v
0 ¡mj2 (2)¢ = Ã2 (2) (A.20)
where the multipliers Ã1 (1) ; Ã1 (2) ; Ã2 (1) and Ã2 (2) are the multipliers of the
following restrictions
p®m11 + (1¡ p)m21 (1) 5 p®c11 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) (A.21)
p®m11 5 p®c11 (A.22)
p (1¡ ®)m12 (1) 5 p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) (A.23)
p (1¡ ®)m12 (2) + (1¡ p)m22 (2) 5 p (1¡ ®) c12 (2) + (1¡ p) c22 (2) (A.24)
Note …rst that at the solution of this problem it must be that y¤ = 0 here too.
Then we must have again that:
Á1 (1) = Á2 (1) (A.25)
Á1 (2) = Á2 (2) (A.26)
and also it still true that c12 (2) = c
2
2 (2) and now m
1
2 (2) = m
2
2 (2) ´ m2 (2) : Then:
q2 [u
0 (c2 (2)) + v0 (m2 (2))] = Á1 (2) (A.27)£
u0
¡
c21 (1)
¢
+ v0
¡
m21 (1)
¢¤
=
£
u0
¡
c12 (1)
¢
+ v0
¡
m12 (1)
¢¤
(A.28)
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And also it must happen that:£
u0
¡
c11
¢
+ v0
¡
m11
¢¤
(A.29)
= [Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)]
5 R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)]
= R
©£
u0
¡
c12 (1)
¢
+ v0
¡
m12 (1)
¢¤
+ q2 [u
0 (c2 (2)) + v0 (m2 (2))]
ª
On the other hand, from the date 2 budget constraints we need to have
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) + (1¡ p) c21 (1) = [p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] c2 (2) (A.30)
Consider …rst the case in which ¹m 5 ¹c: This implies that the solution to the
bank problem is identical to the …rst best allocation. This is so because at ¹m we
have v0 ( ¹m) = 0: In this case we should have then Ã1 (1) = Ã1 (2) = Ã2 (1) = Ã2 (2)
= 0: But then the consumption allocation that satis…es the …rst order conditions
of the bank problem are identical to those of the social planner. But the …rst best
allocation satis…es with equality the incentive compatibility constraint. Then
whenever ¹m < ¹c the …rst best is the solution to the commercial bank optimization
problem. By strict concavity of the objective function this solution is unique.
Suppose then that ¹c < ¹m: Now the …rst best cannot be a solution to the
commercial bank problem because otherwise the constraints A.21, A.22, A.23 and
A.24 are violated. This shows the …rst part of the proposition.
Next I show the existence of an equilibrium in which c11 = c
2
1 (1) and mt (s) <
¹m whenever ¹c < ¹m: Guessing that all four constraints A.21, A.22, A.23 and A.24
are binding it must be that Ãt (s) > 0: Guessing also that c
1
1 = c
2
1 (1) we have
that: £
u0
¡
c11
¢
+ v0
¡
m11
¢¤
(A.31)
= [Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)]
= q1
£
u0
¡
c21 (1)
¢
+ v0
¡
m21 (1)
¢¤
+ Á1 (2)
= q1
£
u0
¡
c11
¢
+ v0
¡
m11
¢¤
+ Á1 (2)
Then
q2
£
u0
¡
c11
¢
+ v0
¡
m11
¢¤
= Á1 (2) (A.32)
= q2 [u
0 (c2 (2)) + v0 (m2 (2))]
and then £
u0
¡
c11
¢
+ v0
¡
m11
¢¤
= [u0 (c2 (2)) + v0 (m2 (2))] (A.33)
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But we also had
u0
¡
c12 (1)
¢
+ v0
¡
m12 (1)
¢
= u0
¡
c21 (1)
¢
+ v0
¡
m21 (1)
¢
= u0
¡
c11
¢
+ v0
¡
m11
¢
= u0 (c2 (2)) + v0 (m2 (2))
But then it must be the case that c12 (1) = c2 (2) : Suppose otherwise. The …rst
case is that c12 (1) < c2 (2) : Then u
0 (c12 (1)) > u
0 (c2 (2)) : But then v0 (m12 (1)) <
v0 (m2 (2)) : This implies that m12 (1) > m2 (2) : But then c
1
2 (1) > c2 (2) ; a contra-
diction. The opposite inequality works in a similar way. Then it must be the case
that c12 (1) = c2 (2) and m
1
2 (1) = m2 (2) : This also implies from the equality A.30
that
c12 (1) = c2 (2) = c
2
1 (1) (A.34)
but then c11 = c
1
2 (1) ´ ccb and then also m12 (1) = m2 (2) = m21 (1) = m11 ´ mcb:
This implies perfect risk sharing but it is clearly less preferable than the …rst best
since the level of local currency consumption mcb is less than ¹m:
A.3. Proof of Proposition 5.1
Firstly, it is clear that the optimal amount of local currency is ¹m; since the cost
of printing pesos is always zero. Next, the necessary and su¢cient …rst-order
conditions with respect of x; y and ¸ (s) of the second best problem are the
following.
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = Á0 (A.35)
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 Á0 (A.36)
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) (A.37)
where ¿ (s) is the multiplier of the constraint d+¸ (s) 5 ¹d: The FOC corresponding
to the consumption allocations are as follows.
u0
¡
c11
¢
= Á1 (1) + Á1 (2) (A.38)
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)¢ = Á1 (1) (A.39)
q1u
0 ¡c12 (1)¢ = Á2 (1) (A.40)
q2u
0 ¡cj2 (2)¢ = Á2 (2) (A.41)
which again implies that c12 (2) = c
2
2 (2) ´ c2 (2). Finally, the FOC with respect
to d is
Á0 =
2X
s=1
¿ (s) +
2X
s=1
Á2 (s) (A.42)
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This condition must hold since it must be the case that d > 0: Otherwise x = 0 but
then consumption of patient agents is always zero. Hence this last FOC must hold
with equality. Since the objective function is strictly concave, the solution to be
characterized must be unique. I show now that this equilibrium is characterized
by ¸ (1) > 0; ¸ (2) ¸ 0 and y ¸ 0: Under these conditions it must be the case that
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = Á0 (A.43)
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 Á0 (A.44)
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) (A.45)
Á0 =
2X
s=1
¿ (s) +
2X
s=1
Á2 (s) (A.46)
and so
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] =
2X
s=1
¿ (s) +
2X
s=1
Á2 (s) (A.47)
This implies
2X
s=1
¿ (s) = (R¡ 1) [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] > 0 (A.48)
which means that for at least one s; ¿ (s) > 0: On the other hand it must be the
case that
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = [Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] (A.49)
This is because either y > 0; or, if this is zero, then it must be the case that
¸ (s) > 0 for s = 1; 2: In both cases we arrive to this last equality. Hence we have:
u0
¡
c11
¢
= R [q1u
0 (c2 (1)) + q2u0 (c2 (2))] (A.50)
On the other hand we have that if ¸ (1) > 0; then
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)¢ = q1u0 ¡c22 (1)¢+ ¿ (1) (A.51)
¸ q1u0
¡
c22 (1)
¢
which implies c21 (1) 5 c22 (1) : Also, from the date 1 and 2 budget constraints:
p (1¡ ®) c2 (1) + (1¡ p) c21 (1) = [p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] c2 (2) (A.52)
since they hold with equality. Therefore it must be the case that
c21 (1) 5 c2 (2) 5 c22 (1) (A.53)
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However, the fact that the date 1 budget constraints hold with equality implies
¸ (1) = (1¡ p) c21 (1) + ¸ (2) (A.54)
but so ¸ (1) > ¸ (2) : On the other hand, it clear that
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] =
2X
s=1
¿ (s) +
2X
s=1
Á2 (s) = [Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)]
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) ; s = 1; 2
But the …rst two equalities imply that for each s, Á1 (s) = Á2 (s)+ ¿ (s) : Suppose,
instead, that for some s; Á1 (s) < Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) : Then, summing over s we have
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] <
P2
s=1 ¿ (s)+
P2
s=1 Á2 (s) ; which contradicts the second equality
on the …rst line. Hence it must happen that Á1 (s) = Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) for every s:
On the other hand, since ¸ (1) > ¸ (2) ; clearly it is true that ¸ (1) > 0: Therefore
it must be the case that ¿ (1) > 0: If this were not the case, then ¿ (2) should be
positive, since for at least one s; ¿ (s) > 0: But then ¸ (2) + d = ¹d; but then ¸ (1)
+ d > ¹d; violating the constraint. Therefore ¿ (1) > 0 and so ¸ (1) + d = ¹d: But
then ¸ (2) + d < ¹d and so ¿ (2) = 0: This implies that:
u0
¡
c11
¢
= [Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] (A.55)
= q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)¢+ Á1 (2)
= q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)¢+ Á2 (2)
= q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)¢+ q2u0 (c2 (2))
and so
q1
£
u0
¡
c11
¢ ¡ u0 ¡c21 (1)¢¤ = q2 £u0 (c2 (2))¡ u0 ¡c11¢¤ (A.56)
meaning that
sgn
£
c11 ¡ c21 (1)
¤
= sgn
£
c2 (2)¡ c11
¤
(A.57)
I show now that sgn [c11 ¡ c21 (1)] > 0; which proves partial suspension of convert-
ibility. Suppose that this is not the case, that is, sgn [c11 ¡ c21 (1)] < 0: Then c2 (2)
< c11: But then c2 (2) < c
2
1 (1) ; contradicting the statement above. Therefore it
must be that c11 ¸ c21 (1) : However, if c11 = c21 (1) then it must be true that
c11 = c
2
1 (1) = c2 (1) = c2 (2) (A.58)
But this implies that q1u0 (c21 (1)) = q1u
0 (c22 (1)) : But then, from
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)¢ = q1u0 ¡c22 (1)¢+ ¿ (1) (A.59)
then ¿ (1) = 0; contradicting the result above. This implies that c11 > c
2
1 (1)
showing that partial suspension of convertibility of deposits must hold. This
also implies that c2 (2) > c11; showing that the optimal allocation is incentive
compatible. This ends the proof of this proposition.
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 5.3
Ignoring the incentive compatibility constraints, the problem can be written as
the maximization of
p
"
®
£
u
¡
c11
¢
+ v
¡
m11
¢¤
+ (1¡ ®)
Ã
2X
s=1
qs
¡
u
¡
c12 (s)
¢
+ v
¡
m12 (s)
¢¢!#
(A.60)
+(1¡ p) ¡q1 ¡u ¡c21 (1)¢+ v ¡m21 (1)¢¢+ q2 ¡u ¡c22 (2)¢+ v ¡m22 (2)¢¢¢
subject to
x+ y 5 d (A.61)
p®c11 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) 5 ¸ (1) + y (A.62)
p®c11 5 ¸ (2) + y (A.63)
p (1¡ ®) c2 (1) 5 Rx¡ ¹d (A.64)
[p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] c2 (2) 5 Rx¡ ¹d (A.65)
d+ ¸ (s) 5 ¹d (A.66)
together with
¸ (1) 5 p®w11 + (1¡ p)w21 (1) (A.67)
¸ (2) 5 p®w11 (A.68)
Rx¡ ¹d 5 p (1¡ ®)w12 (1) (A.69)
Rx¡ ¹d 5 p (1¡ ®)w12 (2) + (1¡ p)w22 (2) (A.70)
mjt (s) 5 wjt (s) (A.71)
The …rst order conditions with respect to x; y and ¸ (s) are as follows.
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)¡ ´2 (1)¡ ´2 (2)] = Á0 (A.72)
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 Á0 (A.73)
Á1 (1) 5 Á2 (1) + ´1 (1) (A.74)
Á1 (2) 5 Á2 (2) + ´1 (2) (A.75)
where ´1 (1) is the multiplier of A.67, ´1 (2) that of A.68, ´2 (1) that of A.69 and
´2 (2) that of A.70. The rest of the …rst order conditions are as follows.
u0
¡
c11
¢
= Á1 (1) + Á1 (2) (A.76)
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)¢ = Á1 (1) (A.77)
q1u
0 ¡c12 (1)¢ = Á2 (1) (A.78)
q2u
0 ¡cj2 (2)¢ = Á2 (2) (A.79)
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p®v0
¡
m11
¢
= µ11 (A.80)
q1 (1¡ p) v0
¡
m21 (1)
¢
= µ21 (1) (A.81)
q1p®v
0 ¡m12 (1)¢ = µ2 (1) (A.82)
q2v
0 (m2 (2)) = µ2 (2) (A.83)
and £
´11 + ´
2
1 (1)
¤
p®+ µ11 = 0 (A.84)
´21 (1) p® + µ
2
1 (1) = 0 (A.85)
p (1¡ ®) ´2 (1) + µ2 (1) = 0 (A.86)
[p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p] ´2 (2) + µ2 (2) = 0 (A.87)
where µjt (s) is the multiplier of the constraints A.71. However, since all multipliers
are non-negative, then the last four equations imply that ´11 = ´
2
1 (1) = ´2 (1) =
´2 (2) = 0: This implies that the optimal local currency holding is equal to ¹m;
the satiation level. But then the …rst order conditions above are exactly those of
the socially e¢cient allocation. Then the optimal dollar consumption allocation
is the one given in the constrained optimum. This completes the proof.
A.5. Proof of proposition 5.4
The condition
r < R
µ
c21 (1)
c2 (1)
¶
(A.88)
is equivalent to
r <
p (1¡ ®) c21 (1)³
p(1¡®)c2(1)
R
´ (A.89)
which is true if and only if
r <
p (1¡ ®) c21 (1)³
p(1¡®)c2(1)+ ¹d¡ ¹d
R
´ (A.90)
However, the second best implies that
¹d = ¸ (1) + d (A.91)
and so
r <
p (1¡ ®) c21 (1)³
p(1¡®)c2(1)+(¸(1)+d)¡(¸(1)+d)
R
´ (A.92)
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and also at the solution of the second best problem:
Rx¡ d¡ ¸ (1) = p (1¡ ®) c2 (1) (A.93)
so that the last inequality is equivalent to
r
µ
x¡ ¸ (1) + d
R
¶
< p (1¡ ®) c21 (1) (A.94)
But then the same argument as in proposition ?? is applied here. Suppose all
patient consumers believe that the others withdraw from the commercial banks
at date 1. The intermediaries pay c11 to the …rst ®p and c
2
1 (1) consumers, …nancing
both by borrowing ¸ (1) dollars from abroad and or with the total amount of short
run investment y (if this is positive). Note again that although the true state may
be s = 2; if ®p+ 1¡ p agents show up then the commercial bank thinks that the
true state is s = 1: If more consumers show up the intermediaries must still pay
c21 (1)pesos to each one, which will be exchanged for dollars at the Central Bank.
But the amount of resources left is equal to r
³
¹x¡ d+¸(1)
R
´
: This happens because
the intermediary liquidates
³
¹x¡ d+¸(1)
R
´
units of the long term investment at date
1 in order to satisfy withdrawals. Since this is strictly less than payments needed
to be done if all the rest of agents withdraw then the bank fails (in the sense that
not all consumers are satis…ed, although debt at date 2 is perfectly honored).
All agents know that this happens if everybody runs against the bank. Then
if every individual consumer thinks that the rest of the population runs, then it
is optimal to withdraw early. This is because the expected utility of withdrawing
early is strictly greater than u (0) + v (0) : But then in this case the commercial
bank fails.
Suppose that the opposite inequality holds. I show now that there is no run.
Suppose then that
r ¸ R
µ
c21 (1)
c2 (1)
¶
(A.95)
Therefore, by the same argument as before,
r
µ
x¡ ¸ (1) + d
R
¶
¸ p (1¡ ®) c21 (1) (A.96)
Consider now the following situation. Suppose that a total measure of p® +
1 ¡ p + b¼ consumers try to withdraw from commercial banks at date 1; withb¼ < p (1¡ ®) : Again the …rst p® consumers get c11 while the rest of agents get
c21 (1) : In order to satisfy withdrawals by b¼ consumers commercial banks must
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liquidate a portion of the long term investment. Let bl be the total liquidation of
this investment. This must satisfy
bl = b¼c21 (1)
r
(A.97)
In period 2 total per-capita resources are given by:
Rx¡ ¹d¡Rbl (A.98)
= p (1¡ ®) c2 (1)¡Rb¼c21 (1)
r
But since r ¸ R
³
c21(1)
c2(1)
´
; then R
r
c21 (1) 5 c2 (1) and therefore
p (1¡ ®) c2 (1)¡Rb¼c21 (1)
r
¸ p (1¡ ®) c2 (1)¡ b¼c2 (1) (A.99)
= [p (1¡ ®)¡ b¼] c2 (1)
This means that commercial banks have enough resources so that patient con-
sumers waiting until period 2 consume c2 (1) dollars and ¹m pesos (provided that
a local lender of last resort may cover extra local currency needs if ¹m > c2 (1)).
Hence banks do not fail and patient consumers do not …nd optimal to run. This
is because, by running they get at most c11 dollars (if included …rst in line) that
can be stored until til period 2: Since they are patient consumers, they consume
a null amount of local currency. Hence each patient consumer is strictly better
o¤ by waiting until date 2: This concludes the proof.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5.5
The only change in the proof of proposition 4.4 is in period 2 resources. If the
interest rate is equal to ½ then the amount of dollars available at date 2 is
Rx¡ ¡ ¹d+ ¸ (1)¢ ¡ ½¼^c21 (1) (A.100)
By the same arguments as before this is equal to
p (1¡ ®) c2 (1)¡ ½¼^c21 (1) (A.101)
Since ½ 5 c2 (1) = c21 (1) then the last expression is at least equal to c2 (1) ¸ c21 (1) :
This implies again that for any patient consumer it is best to wait until period 2.
This ends the proof.
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A.7. Proof of proposition 6.1
The …rst order condition that characterizes the optimal plan in this case are the
following.
q (s)u0 (ct (s)) = Át (s)
with t = 1; 2; and s = 1; 2;
Á0 = R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)]
Á0 =
2X
s=1
(Á2 (s) + ¿ (s))
Á1 (1) + Á1 (2) 5 Á0
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) ; s = 1; 2
where the …rst expression is the …rst derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to
ct (s) ; the second two equalities are the derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect
to x and d (both should be positive to ensure that c2 (s) > 0) and the two weak
inequalities are the …rst derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to y and ¸ (s)
respectively. It is clear again that either y > 0 or, if y = 0; then ¸ (s) > 0 for
both s: Therefore
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] =
2X
s=1
(Á2 (s) + ¿ (s)) = Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)
This implies that Á1 (s) = Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) for each s: Otherwise the second equality
would be violated. The …rst equality implies that at least for some s; ¿ (s) > 0;
since R > 1: Therefore, for both s; u0 (c2 (s)) 5 u0 (c1 (s)) ; with at least for some
s; the inequality is strict. Hence it is true that c2 (s) ¸ c1 (s) for both s; and
with strict inequality for at least one s: Hence the optimal solution is incentive
compatible for patient consumers.
To show that this allocation is better from the ex-ante point of view for agents,
consider the following. Take the optimal consumption allocation from the plan-
ner’s problem in section 5. Consider the following alternative consumption allo-
cation
bc1 (1) ´ µ p®
p® + 1¡ p
¶
c11 +
µ
1¡ p
p® + 1¡ p
¶
c21 (1)
bc1 (2) ´ c11bc2 (s) ´ c2 (s)
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It is clear that the hat allocation, together with the investment and borrowing
plan (x; y; d; ¸ (1) ; ¸ (2)) from the solution satisfy all constraints. This is because
[p® + 1¡ p]bc1 (1)
= [p® + 1¡ p]
µ
p®
p®+ 1¡ p
¶
c11 +
µ
1¡ p
p®+ 1¡ p
¶
c21 (1)
¸
= p®c11 + (1¡ p) c12 (1)
= y + ¸ (1)
and clearly, bc1 (2) and bc2 (s) also satisfy the other constraints by construction.
However, this hat allocation gives a strictly higher ex-ante utility. This is because
of the following. Original preferences are represented by equation 3.1. Given that
the solution implies that mt (s) = ¹m for all t and s; then the relevant part of the
utility function (the part that only includes utility for dollars) can be written as
q1
£
p®u
¡
c11
¢
+ (1¡ p) u ¡c21 (1)¢+ p (1¡ ®)u (c2 (1))¤
+q2
£
p®u
¡
c11
¢
+ (p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p)u (c2 (2))
¤
But since u is strictly concave
u (bc1 (1)) > µ p®
p®+ 1¡ p
¶
u
¡
c11
¢
+
µ
1¡ p
p®+ 1¡ p
¶
u
¡
c21 (1)
¢
and hence
p®u
¡
c11
¢
+ (1¡ p)u ¡c21 (1)¢ < [p®+ 1¡ p] u (bc1 (1))
Therefore ex-ante utility under the hat allocation is strictly higher than under the
optimal solution with non public revelation of s (solution of the planner’s problem
of section 5). Therefore the solution to the planner’s problem in section 6 must
yield a strictly higher utility than the solution to the planner’s problem in section
5. This ends the proof.
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